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I~ rl~HE SUPREME COURT 
()F --rHE 
ST A,_fE OF UTAH 
HAROLD BURLEIGH, 
Plaintiff and :1 ppellant, 
-- \'S.-
\\'ARDEN JOHN W. TURNER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 10007 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Harold Burleigh, appeals from a deci-
sion of the Honorable R. L. Tuckett, Judge, Fourth Judicial 
District, State of Utah, denying the appellant's petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus. 
DISPOSITIO:\f OF THE CASE BELOW 
On September 9, 1963, the appellant, Harold Burleigh, 
filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah (Case No. 9988). By order of the Chief Jus-
tice, on September 9, 1963, the appellant's petition was 
referred for hearing before the Honorable R. L. Tuckett, 
Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County. The 
respondent filed an answer to the petition on the 16th day 
of September, 1963. On September 17 and September 20, 
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1963, hearing was had before the trial court on the sub-
stance of the appellant's petition for habeas corpus. On 
September 20, 1963, the trial court entered a minute order 
which was filed on October 8, 1963, denying the appellant's 
petition for habeas corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent contends the case is not at the present time 
properly before the court, and/or that the decision of Judge 
Tuckett should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's petition in this case was filed as an origi-
nal writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court. ( R. 4) . 
The Chief Justice thereafter referred the matter for hearing 
before the Fourth Judicial District Court. ( R. 3 ) . The 
appellant alleged in his petition that on the 6th day of No-
vember, 1959, he was committed to the Utah State Prison 
on the charge of issuing a fictitious check, in violation of 
76-26-7, U.C.A. 1953. (R. 5). The appellant alleged that 
the commitment was pursuant to a plea of guilty entered 
before the court on the 6th day of November, 1959, but that 
the plea of guilty was the result of an erroneous identifica-
tion of the appellant as the individual who had issued a 
fictitious check which was the subject of the information. 
Further, the appellant alleged that his health was in jeop-
ardy as the result of narcotics withdrawal, hepatitis, etc., 
and that he entered the plea in order to obtain hospitaliza-
tion. (R. 5, 6). 
Appellant's petition alleged that he had theretofore un-
successfully sought relief by habeas corpus from the same 
commitment by a petition and hearing before the Honor-
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abk Joseph G. Jeppson on December 14,1961 and January 
~). l~l6~. (R. 6). A copy of the proceedings before the Hon-
orabk A. H. Ellett on November 6, 1959, at which time the 
appellant plead guilty, were attached to and made a part of 
the record. ( R. 20 through 23) . These proceedings dis-
closed that the appellant was represented by counsel, Sum-
ncr J. Hatch, Esq.; that he was interrogated by the court 
and l\lr. Hatch relating to the entry of his plea of guilty. 
(R. 21). 
"~lR. HATCH: ~[r. Burleigh, you understand youhavearightfor 
a period of time to enter a plea in this court? 
~ll~. BURLEIGH: That's right. 
~lR. I lATCH: And you have heard the information? 
~ lR. BURLEIGH: Right. 
~ lR. HATCH: .\nd you have discussed the matter with me as to 
the basis of the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by 
law and what it is? 
~lR. BURLEIGH: I have. 
~lR. HATCH: And you are also aware that after entering a plea 
that with the record you have, there is no basis for referring for 
parole and probation. Is that correct? 
~lR. BURLEIGH: That's correct . 
. MR. HATCH: And you are ready to enter a plea at this time? 
~1R. BURLEIGH: That's correct. 
THE COURT: What plea will you enter? 
~ LR. BURLEIGH: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Is that your advice to him, Mr. Hatch? 
MR. HATCH: That is my advice to him, Your Honor. We fur-
ther for the record waive the time for sentencing on his statement . 
. -\t this time- I mean for entering plea. We would also I believe 
wai\·e time for sentencing. Is that correct, Mr. Burleigh? 
~IR. BURLEIGH: That's correct." 
The record of the proceedings before the Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson was certified as part of the record of 
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this case on appeal. It appeared that on the 30th day of 
January, 1962, Judge Jeppson, pursuant to the previous 
hearing upon the appellant's petition, entered his findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, and that on the same day 
entered his judgment denying the appellant's exceptions 
thereto and the appellant's petition for habeas corpus. The 
appellant did not perfect an appeal from that decision, but 
on September 9, 1963, approximately eight months later, 
filed an original writ before the Supreme Court. 
At the time of the hearing before Judge Tuckett, the 
trial court heard two witnesses who gave evidence as to the 
appellant's petition. The first was a Mr. Kresh Juretich 
(R. 182), who testified that he saw the appellant in the 
County Jail prior to his commitment, and that he was sick 
and in need of a doctor, and that, in his opinion, he was not 
guilty. (R. 183-184). Gladys Nieser was called and testi-
fied that in 1959 she was a checker at Albertson's Market, 
Second South and Fourth East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 
185) ; that she accepted a fictitious check and at that time 
identified Mr. Burleigh, the appellant, as the individual 
who passed the check. (R. 186). However, she is presently 
of the opinion that it was another individual and not Mr. 
Burleigh. ( R. 186) . 
The record of the proceeding before Judge Jeppson was 
apparently considered by the trial court in the hearing be-
fore Judge Tuckett. (R. 173). The evidence in this pro-
ceeding discloses that upon the appellant's commitment to 
the State Prison, Dr. William C. Knott, the attending physi-
cian at the State Prison, diagnosed the appellant as suffer-
ing from withdrawal symptoms attendant to narcotics ad-
diction, hepatitis, and having flesh burns on his chest. (R. 
52). He was very sick at that time. ( R. 53). However, he 
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was lucid and not mentally deranged. ( R. 55, 56). The ap-
pellant, who testified at his previous hearing, indicated that 
he knew what he was doing at the time he plead guilty ( R. 
111), and that he had previously discussed the action he 
took with counsel. (R. 103). Further, he was aware that 
pleading guilty to a fictitious check charge carried a lesser 
penalty than a second conviction for narcotics violation, 
and there were two charges pending against him for nar-
cotics violation. ( R. 86, 102) . 
The evidence offered at that hearing relative to the iden-
tity of the appellant having committed the crime showed 
that Mrs. Nieser had originally identified him as being the 
individual who had passed the fictitious check at her place 
of employment. ( R. 59-60) . Thereafter she identified Mr. 
Burleigh as the culprit in a police lineup. She indicated 
that at that time, the time of the hearing before Judge 
Jeppson, she felt that another individual by the name of 
Crane was the person who had passed the check, but she 
admitted that there was no question in her mind at the time 
of her identification of Mr. Burleigh, that she thought he 
was the individual who had committed the crime. ( R. 7 6) . 
Judge Jeppson, in his findings of fact, found that the 
petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntary, and that at the 
time he entered the plea, he was in complete control of his 
mental faculties and entered the plea in an effort to obtain 
the benefit of not being charged on narcotics offenses. ( R. 
28) . The court felt that there was no clear factual basis 
warranting relief. ( R. 29). 
Based upon all the evidence before Judge Tuckett, he 
orally stated on the 20th day of September, 1963, that the 
appellant's petition was denied. (R. 188). No order to that 
effect "·as ever entered. A minute entry was entered by the 
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clerk denying the petition on October 8, 1963. (R. 42, rear 
of page). On the 8th day of October, 1963, the appellant 
filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court from the deci-
sion of Judge Tuckett. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CASE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT ON APPEAL. 
The record discloses that no formal order has ever been 
entered by the trial court denying the appellant's petition 
for habeas corpus. 78-2-2, U.C.A. 1953, gives the Supreme 
Court the right to issue an original writ of habeas corpus. 
The writ in this instance, although directed to the Supreme 
Court, was made returnable before the District Court. As 
a consequence, the action of the District Court was not the 
act of the Supreme Court, nor did it purport to act as a 
master in taking evidence by referring the matter to the 
Supreme Court. As a consequence, it is necessary that a 
final order be entered before the Supreme Court may have 
appellate jurisdiction. 78-2-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
Habeas corpus is a civil remedy and generally governed 
by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Winnovich v. Emery, 33 
Utah 345, 93 Pac. 988; State v. Kelsey, 64 Utah 377, 231 
Pac. 122. In such cases, it is clear that a minute entry is not 
a final judgment of the trial court from which an appeal 
may lie. Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 
1277, this court ruled that a minute entry entered by the 
trial court was not such an order as would be appealable, 
and thus allow the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction. The 
court stated: 
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··.\nd it is well settled in this jurisdiction that an appeal from what 
constitutes a finding merely as compared to a judgment which 
actually adjudicates the rights of the parties is not appealable. 
Thus, an appeal from a verdict where judgment has not been 
entered. Kourbetis v. National Copper Bank, 71 Utah 232, 264 
P. 72·1. Nor from an order for judgment. Ellinwood v. Bennion, 
73 Ctah 23-29 563, 276 P. 159. Nor from a minute order dis-
Inissing appeal.***" 
Since no final order has been entered in this matter, it is 
submitted that this court is without jurisdiction to review 
the trial court's action until such order is entered. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT MAY NOT CLAIM RELIEF ON HABEAS 
CORPUS BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF AN APPEAL TO BE 
TAKEN FROM A PREVIOUS ADVERSE DETERMINATION 
0:'-I AN APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
The appellant, for the first time on appeal, contends that 
he should not be precluded or barred by his previous ap-
plication, and the denial thereof, for a writ of habeas corpus 
before the Honorable Joseph Jeppson because of failure to 
appeal. No issue was made at the hearing before the Hon-
orable R. L. Tuckett that he was in anyway prevented from 
taking an appeal, nor did he protest in anyway the failure 
of an appeal to be taken in his behalf. Thus, the first time 
the question has been raised as to whether or not the ap-
pellant may have some remedy still available to him on 
account of the failure of a previous appeal appears in his 
brief now on file before this court. The appellant contends 
that it was a failure of counsel to perfect his appeal rather 
than a failure of any action on his part. 
It should be noted, first, that there is no requirement that 
counsel be furnished to a petitioner seeking relief by habeas 
corpus. The decision of Douglas v. California, 83 S.Ct. 814 
( 1963) involved only the question of whether or not due 
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process required that counsel be furnished during the "first 
appeal" from a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court 
in that case specifically denied that it was deciding the issue 
of whether counsel must be provided an indigent seeking a 
discretionary hearing after his appeal. 
In a monograph entitled, "Increased Rights for Defend-
ants in State Criminal Prosecutions," National Association 
of Attorneys General, page 33, it is noted that at the pres-
ent time there is no requirement that counsel be provided 
in collateral proceedings, and that due process has not as 
yet been extended to encompass such a requirement, even 
within the federal system.1 Even so, the motion filed in this 
case, No. 10007, clearly demonstrates that every effort was 
made by the court to provide counsel for the accused, and 
that various counsel who examined the nature of the ap-
pellant's petition felt that there was no merit to the position. 
Although not a matter of record, but a matter of which 
this court may take judicial notice, is the fact that Calvin 
E. Clark, who acted as counsel for the appellant, indicated 
in the presence of the Chief Justice and a member of the 
Attorney General's office that he could find no basis to claim 
relief on appeal. Even so, it is well settled that habeas cor-
pus is not an appropriate remedy to claim relief because of 
the failure of counsel to perfect an appeal. 19 A.L.R.2d 
789. In the previously referred to annotation, at page 794, 
it is noted: 
"Generally, one convicted of crime in a court having jurisdiction, 
without violation of any constitutional right, cannot successfully 
contend in habeas corpus proceedings that he was deprived of the 
right to appeal by reason merely of some act or omission of his 
counsel resulting in failure to get it heard in the appellate court." 
1 Copies of this monograph were supplied to this court by the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General. 
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Srr also AI oore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, lOth Circuit 
( 1939) , ".here the court stated : 
"* * * [It] is not a necessary element of due process of law and is not 
incumbent upon the trial court to see to it that defendant's attor-
ney perfects an appeal." 
Sec also Ex Parte Whitson, 70 Okla. Crim. 79, 104 P.2d 
980 ( 1940). 
Consequently, appellant is in no position to claim relief 
by virtue of an alleged failure of hired or appointed counsel 
to perfect an appeal. The nature of the case itself is such 
that a reasonable conclusion arises that counsel could find 
no meritorious basis for an appeal. 
POINT III. 
APPELL:\~\T IS ENTITLED TO NO RELIEF BASED UPON 
THE RECORD NOW BEFORE THE COURT. 
The record in the instant case discloses that the appel-
lant knowingly plead guilty to the offense for which he is 
now being detained. Appellant's plea of guilty was accepted 
by the court only after full inquiry by both the court and 
counsel as to whether or not the appellant was fully aware 
of the act he was undertaking. The appellant, himself, by 
his testimony before Judge Jeppson, admitted that he knew 
what he was doing at the time he entered his plea of guilty. 
(R. 111). It is ,,·ell settled that a plea of guilty has the 
effect of admitting each and every element of the crime, 
including the identity of the accused as being the individual 
charged in the information, and being the individual who 
committed the crime. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th 
Ed., Sec. 91, notes: 
"The plea of guilty, unless withdrawn, has the same effect in respect 
to the subsequent proceedings thereon against the accused as aver-
dict of guilty." 
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Consequently, when the appellant entered his plea, know-
ing full well the consequences of the plea and the nature 
of the act he was doing, he cannot now be heard to com-
plain. There is no contention that his will was overborne 
by the prosecution or the court, and Judge Jeppson ex-
pressly found that the appellant was in complete control 
of his mental faculties at the time he entered his plea, and 
that he did so, in part, to obtain the benefits of reduced ac-
tion against him on other pending narcotics charges. Al-
though there is nothing express in the record which would 
indicate that a direct promise was made that the narcotics 
charges would be dropped, there is substantial evidence to 
indicate that the appellant was aware that his commitment 
on the fictitious check charge may have deterred the prose-
cution on the narcotics charge. Further, there is no evidence 
that the narcotics charges have in fact been pressed. There-
fore, it must be concluded that there is no merit to the ap-
pellant's contention that his plea of guilty was not volun-
tarily entered, and that he now may seek some relief to void 
that plea. 
Although the appellant contends that he was not the in-
dividual who committed the crime, he does not deny that 
he was the individual in fact who was charged with the 
crime. It is well settled that the question of guilt or inno-
cence is not a proper matter for inquiry on habeas corpus. 
Most recently, the Colorado Supreme Court, in the case 
of Specht v. Tinsley, 385 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1963), stated: 
"Habeas corpus is not intended to take the place of review by writ of 
error, and the fact that one may be improperly or unlawfully con-
fined 'for any criminal or supposed criminal matter' does not, ipso 
facto, entitle him to be 'discharged' or 'admitted to bail' or in 'any 
other manner relieved' through the use of habeas corpus. * * *" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
In 39 C.J.S., Habeas Cor pus, Sec. 13, it is stated: 
·Till' right of a person to the writ of habeas corpus depends on the 
legality or illegality of his detention, and this in turn depends .on 
whether the fundamental requirements of law have been complied 
with, and not at all on the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, or 
the justice or injustice of his detention on the merits. * * *" 
Sec also fj'x Parte Yahne, 193 Cal. 386, 224 Pac. 542. 
The appellant cites several cases in his brief for the 
proposition that identity is a factor subject to inquiry by 
habeas corpus. It must be noted that the identity discussed 
in the cases cited by the appellant does not relate to the 
factual question of whether the accused was or was not the 
person who committed the crime; rather, the issue decided 
by those cases is ( 1 ) whether the individual being held is 
in fact the person charged; ( 2) whether or not there has 
been an impersonation of the person charged, Foster v. 
Perry, 71 Fla. 155, 70 So. 1007; and ( 3), whether or not 
the individual sought to be extradited is in fact the person 
charged with the crime, or whether he was within the juris-
diction to \\·hich he is sought to be returned. Scott and Roe, 
HabeasCorpus,pp.15, 392,407,412. 
Consequently, since the appellant's claim of lack of iden-
tity goes only to a factual determination as to his guilt or 
innocence, it is not a matter properly the subject of inquiry 
by habeas corpus. 
In spite of this, the particular issue must be resolved 
against the appellant's since, first, he admitted his identity 
with his plea of guilty. Secondly, the appellant was the in-
dividual identified by at least one witness at the time of the 
occurrence although some time later the witness retracted 
her identification of the appellant. Further, appellant was 
identified during a police lineup as the culprit. Both trial 
judges made determinations against him relative to whether 
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or not the factual identity was sufficient to sustain the con-
viction. At best, the appellant's contentions go to issues of 
fact which, when analyzed against his plea of guilty, afford 
him no relief by habeas corpus. Further, the previous de-
termination of one court (Judge Jeppson), after full hear-
ing, that there was no merit to the appellant's petition, and 
the subsequent similar determination before another court 
(Judge Tuckett) warrants rejection of any relief on appeal. 
39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, Sec. 105, pp. 698 and 700. 
POINT IV. 
THE APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM RELIEF BY 
HABEAS CORPUS. 
It is submitted that the appellant in the instant case is 
clearly estopped to claim relief by habeas corpus from his 
present commitment. The evidence of record discloses that 
the appellant, with eyes wide open, entered his plea of 
guilty. Judge Jeppson made a finding of fact to the effect 
that the appellant received the benefit of arrested prosecu-
tion on other charges by entering his plea to the instant 
offense, and that the other charges were of a substantially 
more serious nature. To allow the appellant to wait some 
two years from the time of his commitment before seeking 
any judicial relief, where the appellant had full knowledge 
of the facts at the time he entered his plea, would allow 
the appellant to play games with the law. The statute of 
limitations may well have run against the narcotics offenses 
or the prosecution's evidence may no longer be available. 
Having elected the course to follow, the appellant may not 
now, at this late date, request consideration from this court. 
Any error that may exist in the appellant's case was self-
induced and he is, therefore, estopped to request relief. 
58 A.L.R. 1286; 62 A.L.R.2d 432; People v. Vernon, 9 Cal. 
App. 2d 138,49 P.2d 326. 
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CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the record in this case clearly demonstrates 
that there is no legal nor factual basis for appellant to ob-
tain the rdid of this court The court does not have juris-
diction onT the matter, habeas corpus is an inappropriate 
remedy, the record evidences no factual basis for relief, and 
the equities that may be existent in this case are unfavorable 
to the appellant by virtue of his action in precipitating the 
condition he now finds himself in. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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